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ABSTRACT
Extractive resource governance has been a challenging task for resource-rich
countries in Africa. It has fuelled civil wars, ethnic clashes and
underdevelopment in this region. This has turned the so-called resource wealth
into resource curse. To address this particularly nauseating challenge, the
international community came together to adopt the UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights (GPs). Polarised debate on whether the GPs
should be binding or voluntary has slowed down the effective implementation
of the Principles. This article argues that while the GPs have been the latest
attempt at regulating multinational companies (MNCs), greater emphasis
should be placed on the readiness of states to domesticate the Principles. To
achieve this, the paper explores various approaches through which the GPs
can be crafted into national legislation. It also investigates the different methods
through which states can ensure that corporations systemically respect human
rights obligations in their areas of operation. In order to restore faith in the
whole process, it is necessary to examine how human rights principles can be
mainstreamed into corporate practice locally. No doubt, rights-based
frameworks, such as the GPs, are needed to ensure that human rights are
streamlined in business’ projects, policies, and agreements throughout the
various stages, including preparation, funding, implementation and
monitoring. The issue of corporate liability under international law has had
its troubled history, thus, this article argues that MNCs have a heightened
responsibility to respect the human rights of the local communities in resource-
rich, war-torn zones, particularly in sub-Saharan African, using Nigeria as
focal point.
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1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenants
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 and the International Covenants on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966.
2 John G. Ruggie, “Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights”
(2013) (Norton Global Ethics Series). WW Norton & Company.
3 Some of the problems related to human rights violation in the context of resource
extraction include: access to information, water and air pollution, displacement
of citizens from their ancestral lands, lack of participation by locals on development
initiatives related to their community and further impoverishment of peoples
and their community.
4 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Transnational Corporations and Public Accountability”
(2004) 39(2) Government and Opposition 240.
5 HR/PUB/11/04, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
Implementing the United Nations Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework”
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciples Business
HR_EN.pdf> accessed 28 April 2016. [GPs]
6 See the UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 I.L.M. 626
(1984).
1.  INTRODUCTION
Since 1948, several human rights instruments have been adopted to safeguard
the sanctity of human lives. These instruments, collectively referred to as the
International Bill of Rights,1 did not specifically provide for human rights
violations in the context of business activities. The idea that business enterprises
must have human rights responsibilities backed up with legal requirements
in their spheres of operation is relatively new and still not universally accepted.2
Countless expositions have been made concerning states adopting policies
aimed at responsible natural resource extraction. These expositions further
exacerbate the problem rather than create a solution.3 The lack of binding
legal and moral frameworks to guide the behaviour of MNCs emerged as one
of the global socio-economic problems of developing countries that arose
during the late twentieth century.4 The rigorous effort to address these problems
led to the formulation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights in 2011 (GPs).5
In a somewhat geometric progression, the UN set out to regulate corporate
bodies. In 1974, the UN established a Centre for Transnational Corporations
to draft a Multinational Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations.6
The first part of the Draft Code was completed in 1983 while the other part
was completed in 1990. The Code emphatically placed tremendous obligations
on the MNCs to not only respect the laws of the host states but to desist from
any form of political or economic interference in the domestic policies of the
2016 THE FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE UN GPs IN NIGERIA 139
7 Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility
(2001) 111 YLJ 467, 519.
8 OECD (2011), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition,
OECD Publishing, Paris. The Guidelines were updated in 2011 for the fifth time
since they were first adopted in 1976. See <www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/
48004323.pdf> accessed 16 October 2015.
9 John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda
(2007) 101 AJIL 819, 834.
10 See Larry C Backer, Transnational Corporations’ Outward Expression of Inward
Self-Constitution: The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc. (2013) 20
IJGLS 827 [The OECD system of principles for the management of corporate
behaviour beyond the domestic law of states creates a three-dimensional
governance “space” through networks of soft law systems developed by complex
partnerships between states, international organisations that serve them and
global actors, and the global actors that form the core of the regulatory
community].
11 See Gunther Teubner, “Self-Constitutionalising TNCs? On the Linkage of ‘Private’
and ‘Public’ Corporate Codes of Conduct” (2011) 18 IJGLS 635. [These codes
are mere constitutional impulses, which certainly with great influence-
international organisations send toward TNCs. Whether they indeed coagulate
there into binding constitutional norms is not decided by the institutions of the
state world but in the inner processes of private organisations]; see also George
K. Foster, Investors, States, and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in
International Investment and the Stabilising Potential of Investment Treaties
(2013) 17 LCLR 361 [Investors may also owe self-imposed obligations toward
local stakeholders such as OECD].
12 This scheme marks one of the first initiatives to track what is popularly referred
to as blood diamonds (diamonds exploited by MNCs, the proceeds of which
funds rebel governments against legitimate governments) from being imported
from States riddled in conflicts or ethnic wars. Member states would have to
certify that any diamonds to be exported are conflict-free before entering the
international market. See Kimberly Process Core Document <www.kimberley
process.com/en/about> accessed 13 October 2015. See also Holly Cullen, Is
there a Future for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Conflict
Diamonds? (2013) 12 MLJ 2 [She reiterated the fact that the activism of civil
societies brought to limelight the use of diamonds to finance the activities of
host states.7 A few years later the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), recommended some guidelines for MNCs.8 The
OECD guidelines represent the most detailed attempt at regulating MNCs
around that period.9 The Guidelines enjoin companies to respect human rights
in every country where they operate. Notably, much like other regulations,
they were intended to be non-binding.10 Moreover, the MNCs were very
instrumental to the continued growth of the economies of most of the developed
States in the OECD.11
Other various non-binding attempts at regulating activities of MNCs
include the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,12 the Extractive Industries
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armed rebel groups. The Kimberley Process establishes a certification system for
rough diamonds to guarantee they have not been used to fund armed conflict].
13 The Initiative promotes transparent and accountable management of natural
resources. One important objective of this initiative is that countries that
implement the initiative agree to disclose information on tax payments, licences,
contracts and other things, see <https://eiti.org/eiti> accessed 13 October
2015. To see detailed reports on how revenues from member country’s extractive
resources are being managed, see EITI Reports <https://eiti.org/countries/
reports> accessed 13 October 2015. Nigeria domesticated its version of this
initiative and made it imperative on agencies in the extractive industry to ensure
reporting, disclosure and transparency in all revenues from the extractive
industry. See about NEITI <http://neiti.org.ng/index.php?q=pages/
secretariat> accessed 13 October 2015.
14 See The World’s Largest Corporate Sustainability Initiative <www.unglobal
compact.org/what-is-gc> accessed 13 October 2015. See particularly Principles
1 and 2 of the UN Global Compact Principles available at <www.unglobal
compact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles> accessed 13 October 2015. See
also Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights (2000), which concern
extractive sector companies, Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers (2010), the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High Risk Areas (2011); The
FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (2012).
15 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). Article 14 of the Draft Norms
requires MNCs and other business enterprises to carry out their activities in
accordance with national laws, regulations, administrative practices and policies
relating to the preservation of the environment of the countries in which they
operate, as well as in accordance with relevant international agreements,
principles, objectives, responsibilities and standards with regard to the
precautionary principles. They are also to conduct their activities in a manner
contributing to the wider goal of sustainable development.
16 For a comparative analysis of the draft UN Code of Conduct and the Norms, see the
publication of the University of Minnesota Human rights library at <www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/ataglance/compdftun.html> accessed 13 October 2015.
Transparency Initiative,13 and the UN Global Compact.14 In 2003, the UN
adopted the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.15 The United
Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
approved this instrument on 13 August 2003.16  As innovative as most of
these human rights treaties and UN Principles may be, their implementation
across national and international levels have been met with challenges.
Concerns around these challenges have led to calls for an approach that
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17 Madhumita Chatterji, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Indian Context (2014)
Corporate social responsibility and sustainability: Emerging trends in developing
economies ch 1; Rhona K. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (6th Edn,
2014).
18 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
19 UNHCR Res 17/4(2011) UN Doc HR/PUB/11/04.
20 ibid.
21 Larry Cata Backer, “From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable
Governance: The Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations’
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Global
Governance” (2012) 25 PMGBDLJ 69 (analysing an example of the framework
of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights), See United
Nations, The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation
towards a Common Understanding among UN Agencies (2003)
<www.undg.org/archive_docs/6959-The_Human_Rights_Based_ Approach_
to_Development_Cooperation_Towards_a_Common_ Understanding_
among_UN.pdf> accessed 10 October 2015.
22 See section 11 (5) of the Oil Pipelines Act Cap O7, LFN 2004.
mainstreams human rights protection into the extraction of natural resources,
conduct of business and corporate social responsibility (CSR).17
In July 2005, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, appointed Professor
John G. Ruggie as his Special Representative on Business & Human Rights
(SRSG).18  The SRSG, after widespread consultations, eventually drafted the
GPs. On 16 June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution
17/4, endorsed the GPs for implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework.19 The GPs provide a distribution of functions between
the States (as holders of the obligation to protect the human rights established
in international standards) and companies, which are expected to respect
these rights in their activities and apply due diligence procedures in this
regard, especially when operating in developing countries.20 The GPs apply
to States and non-state actors. Through the GPs, human rights are harmonised
and integrated into legislation, policies and project activities, thereby giving
citizens a basis to demand for enforcement.21
Observably, implementation has become a challenge for developing
countries due to corruption, administrative ineptitude, the need to attract
foreign direct investment, weak implementation of the laws in existence and
a dearth of laws that can contend with the developments and dynamics of
globalisation.22 This is especially so in the extractive industries with which
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this article is concerned. This article explores various approaches through
which the GPs can be crafted into national legislation for easy implementation
domestically. It investigates the different methods through which states can
ensure that corporations systemically respect human rights obligations in
their areas of operation. No doubt, rights based frameworks, such as the GPs,
are needed to ensure that human rights are streamlined in business’ projects,
policies, and agreements throughout the various stages, including preparation,
funding, implementation and monitoring. This article argues that MNCs have
a heightened responsibility to respect the human rights of the local communities
in resource-rich, conflict-prone zones in sub-Saharan Africa using Nigeria as
focal point.
The first section of this article is the introduction, while the second presents
case studies of the deleterious effects of the activities of non-state actors. To
contextualise the problem, this section presents two case studies in sub-Saharan
Africa, Nigeria and South Africa, to show how weak extractive resource
governance has led to recurrent violations of the human rights of local
communities in particular and the entire citizens in general. Besides, Nigeria
and South Africa host the largest MNCs in the continent, however, they have
not shown the requisite political will to implement the GPs in its current
form. The third section examines the business and human rights agenda
focusing on the effectiveness of the GPs. It discusses the different areas Nigeria
needs to strengthen its regulatory apparatus to allow for easy implementation
of the GPs. Section four highlights the importance of implementing the GPs,
thereby avoiding the pitfalls of the GPs. Section five concludes the article.
This paper argues that the GPs could be the lens through which human rights
standard could be mainstreamed into corporate conduct and practice. The
strand that runs through this work suggests that if the issue of business and
human rights is not pragmatically addressed, unabated activities of MNCs
could produce indirect effects on the operative enjoyment of human rights.
2.  CONTEXTUAL CASE STUDIES FOR THE
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE
Given that this article deals with extractive resource governance, two case
studies are highlighted to indicate the deleterious effects of the activities of
the MNCs. The essence is to justify that while initiatives, rules and visions,
are needed to ensure effective governance, concerted efforts should aim at
implementing and adapting those principles to the local community who
suffer from the deleterious effects of exploitation.
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23 Timothy Hunt, The Politics of Bones: Dr Owens Wiwa and the Struggle for
Nigeria’s oil (Mcclelland & Stewart 2006); Human Rights Watch, “The Ogoni
Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria” (1 July
1995) <www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7d8c.html> accessed 6 January 2016.
24 UNEP Report, (2011) Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland <http://
postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/ UNEP_OEA.pdf> accessed 6 January
2016.
25 For a detailed literature on Ogoniland, see Olof Lindén & Pålsson Jonas, Oil
Contamination in Ogoniland, Niger Delta (2013) 42(6) AMBIO 685-701; Susana
C. Mijares Pena, Human Rights Violations by Canadian Companies abroad: Choc
v. Hudbay Minerals, Inc. (2014) 5 WJLS 1; Barisere Rachel Konne, Inadequate
Monitoring and Enforcement in the Nigerian Oil Industry: The Case of Shell and
Ogoniland (2014) 47 CILJ 181.
2.1 Case Studies
2.1.1    Niger Delta: The Ogoni Experience (Nigeria)
One community that has suffered tremendous degradation in the Niger Delta
region of Nigeria with remarkable attention in literature is the Ogoni region.
This community has been able to achieve its crusade against the then Nigeria’s
military junta, through social coalition such as the Movement for the Survival
of Ogoni People (MOSOP).23 The comprehensive United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) report in its assessment of about 200 locations in Ogoni,
found that due to the decades of oil exploration and blowouts, oil spillage,
oil slicks, gas flaring and waste discharge, the once alluvial soil of the Niger
Delta is no longer viable for agricultural use and attributes to widespread
land degradation.24
The world-renowned activist and environmentalist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, led
MOSOP in a non-violent crusade against environmental degradation by the
MNCs. In October 1990, MOSOP presented the Ogoni Bill of Rights, a document
requesting the political and economic emancipation of the Ogoni people.
Saro-Wiwa’s efforts on several occasions accused the Nigerian government,
Shell and Chevron of waging environmental wars and genocidal attacks
against the Ogonis and indeed the peoples of the Delta. Outraged by the
courageous efforts of the Ogoni people as led by MOSOP, the military regime
constantly raided the community, resulting into deaths and decapitation of
the Ogoni people. In 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa was accused of complicity in the
killing of four Ogoni chiefs. He was sentenced to death by hanging by a
special military tribunal.25
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26 See About us <www.lonmin.com/> accessed 30 January 2016.
27 See SAPA, Lonmin an Example of Exploitation. Business Report (17 August 2012)
<www.iol.co.za/ business/companies/lonmin-an-example-of-exploitation-
1.1365221#.Vj2FX_mrTIW> accessed 10 January 2016
28 See Marikana Report <http://107.6.66.171/Full%20Report%20of%20the%
20Marikana%20Commision %20of%20Inquiry.pdf> accessed 30 January 2016;
Richard Stupart, The Night before Lonmin’s Explanation African Scene
<www.africanscene.co.za/2012/08/the-night-before-lonmins-explanation/>
accessed 8 January 2016.
29 Liduduma’lingani Mqombothi, Miners Shot Down: May 30, 2014, a haunting
and emotional documentary <http://africasacountry.com/2014/05/miners-
shot-down-a-haunting-and-emotional-documentary/> accessed 28 January,
2016.
2.1.2   The Marikana Incident (South Africa)
The issues surrounding the Ogoni incident also resonated in the Marikana
incident. The Marikana incident started as a wildcat strike by workers engaged
at a mine owned by a British company, Lonmin. The company had spent
large sums of money on a massive programme of expansion leaving it
financially vulnerable. The last thing on its mind was a strike from its
workers.26 The company fired 12,000 South African miners after a protracted
strike over wages. This incident led to sporadic strikes across the South African
mining sector.
The strike arose out of failed labour standards. Workers and the local
communities were not receiving the dividends of mining and good corporate
behaviour was absent; youth unemployment was on the increase, the living
conditions of the mineworkers was appalling, growing inequalities were
evident.27 The strike that ensued saw about 44 platinum miners shot dead by
the South African police on 16 August 2012. The shootings have been described
as a massacre in the South African media and have been compared to
the Sharpeville massacre in 1960.28 Up till today, black workers are exploited
like slaves, and work as rock drillers. Poverty forces many of them to forget
their ambition and leave school.29 The average monthly salary of these rock
drillers in South Africa is about US$500. This condemns them to poverty.
2.2 Concerted Efforts Towards Norm Implementation
These cases remind us of the culture of impunity by States and MNCs in the
extractive resource governance in sub-Saharan Africa. While some countries
have done fairly well within this classification, most African states still grapple
with leadership issues and bad governance. The polarised debate on whether
voluntary or mandatory principles cover what is needed, share the same goal
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30 Jonah Gbemre v. SPDC and Others, Unreported suit no. FHC/B/CS/53/05 (14
November 2005) [The Court indeed, noted that the Attorney-General of Nigeria
regrettably did not put up any appearance, and/or defend the proceedings].
For further explication of this case which shows the earliest attempt at seeking
judicial enforcement of human rights violation by victims of corporate abuse, see
<http://business-humanrights.org/en/gas-flaring-lawsuit-re-oil-companies-in-
nigeria> accessed 16 October, 2015
31 See Doe v. Nestle USA Inc., 738 F.3d 1048; Akpan v. SPDC, C/09/337050 / HA ZA
09-1580, Judgment dated 30 January 2013, delivered by the District Court of
The Hague.
32 See section 3 of the Associated Gas Reinjection Act, Cap A25, Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
– to strengthen accountability for business-related abuses. They only adopt
significantly different approaches in achieving that goal.
The foregoing is based on two salient observations: Firstly, African states
are unwilling to enforce their domestic laws or court judgments when it
comes to business and human rights disputes.30 Whereas, this is where our
efforts should be geared towards. Rather than externalise responsibility and
allow the African continent to be treated like permanent children seeking
protection from adults who are miles away from their borders,31 African
leaders should focus attention on domestic implementation of programmes
and policies. One would have expected that the Ogoni incident would have
been a forgotten history by now. The events associated with that dark era are
still recurring in modern times. Gas is still being flared indiscriminately,
despite rules and laws prohibiting such.32 Pollution of the seas and oceans
occur on a daily basis and so much more.
Secondly, MNCs were simply unprepared for the need to manage the risks
of causing or contributing to human rights harm through their own activities
and business relationships. Hence the numerous litigations against them.
The fact that this is being litigated implies the MNCs find it difficult to adapt
to changing circumstances under the business and human rights regime. Firms
operate in highly challenging contexts. When things go wrong, the companies
are quick to blame the local community of sabotage. On the other hand, the
indigenous people claim that the companies are not doing enough in terms of
being socially responsible. The simple logic, therefore, is if the companies
treat the local communities very well, these communities will in turn accept
the companies and voluntarily provide security for the firm’s installations.
The questions that follow, therefore, are why do companies behave the way
they do when it comes to respect for human rights? Where the States fail to
fulfil their duty of protecting human rights, should firms also contribute to
the failure of the State to uphold certain basic minimum standards of behaviour.
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33 Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2006) 105; EM Macek,
Scratching the corporate back: Why corporations have no incentive to define
human rights (2002) 11 MJGT, 101, 104.
34 The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation is the statutory body of the state
government that regulates activities in the oil and gas industry.
35 See About NNPC, Joint Venture Activities <www.nnpcgroup.com/
NNPCBusiness/Upstream Ventures/JointVentureActivities.aspx> accessed 13
October 2015.
36 HR/PUB/11/04, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusiness
HR_EN.pdf> accessed 28 April, 2016. [GPs]
Is implementation of human rights norms possible in a jurisdiction such as
Nigeria? The next section briefly summarises earliest attempts at regulating
the business and human rights practice.
3.  THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
AGENDA: RENEWED FOCUS
3.1 Are the Guiding Principles Implementable in Nigeria?
Implementation has become a challenge for Nigeria. The political will is
absent due to corruption and a dearth of laws that can contend with the
developments and dynamics of globalisation.33 In Nigeria, there is a Production
Sharing Formula (PSC) between MNCs and the federal government, through
its statutory body.34  These contracts are shrouded in secrecy. The local people
who are direct beneficiaries of the agreement are not consulted.35 If there is
the needed transparency and accountability, then GPs would naturally be
implemented. The lessons of Ogoni do not seem to reverberate in addressing
the social and environmental malaise of the continent. When MNCs are
interested in mining activities, they must follow the terms laid down by the
host country. Mining rights should belong to the indigenous people. If this is
enforced, it is almost certain that the most litigants that would be the MNCs
as against the local communities. As the next section shows, the GPs do not
provide any new obligation for the states besides those already established
under international law, it only creates a path for corporate responsibility for
human rights violations to be addressed vigorously.
3.2 Examining the Effectiveness of the GPs
The aim of this section is to examine the extent to which the GPs, as currently
couched, can be streamlined into domestic legislation so as to make them
implementable. The GPs are structured along three different pillars.36
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37 ibid 3.
38 ibid GP 1.
39 ibid.
40 ibid GP 2.
41 See Commentary to GP 1.
42 HR/PUB/12/02, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An
Interpretative Guide (2012) para 2, question 2, <www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf> accessed 28 April 2016.
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
45 See commentary to GP 1.
3.3 Pillar I: The State Duty to Protect Human Rights37
GP 1 states that: “states must protect against human rights abuse within their
territory … including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate
steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective
policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.”38 States are obligated to
prevent the occurrence of corporate human rights violations and also provide
access to remedies where such violation occurs.39 This Pillar also directs
states to clearly set out ways to ensure companies domiciled in its territory
respect human rights.40
In Nigeria, at the point of incorporation of a company, MNCs should be
made aware of the GPs by including it in each set of incorporation forms.
Furthermore, the GPs indicate that states are not per se responsible for human
rights abuse by private actors.41 If states are not responsible, and MNCs are
mere objects, not subjects, of international law, should their culture of impunity
be made to subsist forever? Ratification of treaties does not add cosmetic
value to the treaties; it commands a high sacrifice on the part of the state to
abide with such treaties. The effect of ratification is to ensure compliance
with international human rights rules and ensure that those operating within
its space do the same.
Indeed, States have various obligations with respect to human rights.
Firstly, they must respect human rights,42 secondly, they must protect human
rights,43 and thirdly, they must fulfil human rights.44 Thus, where states fail,
as is often the case, to take any proactive or positive action towards fulfilling
their human rights obligations, or as the GPs puts it “prevent, investigate,
punish and redress private actors’ abuse,”45 they would be held accountable
for breach of their human rights obligations under international law.
Whether there is a basis or not, moral rules dictate that states have legal,
ethical and moral right to control and regulate the extraterritorial activities
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46 See commentary to GP 2; see also Larry Cata Backer (n 21) 86.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Alien Tort Statute Act is a 1789 United States law that
gives US district courts original jurisdiction in civil action which allows foreigners
to bring an action for torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States; See Preamble to the Act. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
48 It is instructive to note, however, that the commentary advices states to regulate
extraterritorial activities of its companies as this will ensure predictability for
business enterprises by providing coherent and consistent messages, and
preserving the States own reputation.
49 15 U.S.C. S 78dd-1.
50 See Funk Markus, Getting What They Pay For: The Far-reaching Impact of the
Dodd-Frank Acts Whistleblower Bounty’ Incentives on FCPA Enforcement (2010)
5 (19) White Collar Crime Report 1-3.
51  See Fred Luthans & Jonathan Doh, International Management Culture, Strategy,
and Behaviour (9th Edn, Mc-Graw-Hill 2014).
52 GP 3.
53 ibid 13.
of companies domiciled in its jurisdiction or territory.46 This is the essence of
the Alien Tort Statute in the United States,47 and the Canadian policy of
monitoring the activities of its companies abroad.48 In South Africa, the Kings
Report of Corporate Governance mandates South African companies to give
periodic reports of its activities. The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act49
mandates accounting transparency requirements under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 as well as prosecutes bribery and corruption of foreign
officials.50 The essence of the Act is to prohibit any US Company and its
officials, citizens and residents from influencing anyone with personal payments
or rewards.51 Actions like this guard the reputation of the state.
Nigeria is a signatory to international human rights instruments that should
serve as policy indicators for MNCs operating in the country to respect human
rights and to safeguard their reputation. Furthermore, GP 3 emphasises the
importance of States to enforce laws that have the effect of requiring corporations
to respect human rights, ensure that laws and policies governing the creating
and ongoing operation of corporations such as company law enables respect for
human rights.52 Thus, the enforcement of existing laws is key to closing the
governance gap created by globalisation.
3.4 Pillar II: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human
Rights53
Being a “responsibility”, it merely appeals to corporations to ensure that they
conduct themselves in good moral conduct in their spheres of operation. The
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Enterprises, John Ruggie (2008) (para 60).
57 GP 17.
58 ibid.
59 Refer to the Ogoni case.
60 See Oliver De Schutter, Anita Ramasastry et al Human Rights Due Diligence:
The role of States (2012) 1-64, 59 <http://humanrightsinbusiness.eu/wp-
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responsibility on the part of firms to respect human rights is a global standard
of expected conduct.54 To meet their obligations, firms are required to meet
three fundamental principles.
Firstly, firms must have and adhere to a mission statement devoted to
human rights compliance.55 Most, if not all MNCs, have statements regarding
compliance with human rights standards. Mere statements without more, does
not guarantee human rights compliance. There must be an effective regulatory
regime that provides sanction for violation of human rights standards. These
statements are aspirational in nature; therefore, to actualise the policies contained
therein, institutional and functional structure must be put in place to achieve
human rights compliance.56
Secondly, firms must have a due diligence commitment aimed at reducing
the risk of compliance with human rights norms.57 Companies must assess
actual and potential human rights impacts in their spheres of operations.58
Where it is seen that they have violated human rights, they should remediate
the damage or prevent any potential risk of adverse effects. Indeed, MNCs
have the scientific and technological capability to conduct due diligence, but
often times they decide not to. Unfortunately, the state is inherently corrupt
and lacks the will to enforce its environmental laws against erring companies,
more so, the state government is complicit in these violations done by the
MNCs.59 Despite this, due diligence and environmental impact assessments
are important tools for compliance with the GPs. Nigeria should strengthen
its environmental impact assessment to ensure that companies conduct due
diligence periodically so as to avoid untoward events. To further encourage
companies to do this, the Nigerian state can incentivise companies who show
commitment to due diligence compliance.60
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64 International Bill of Rights (n 2).
65 GP 25.
66 GP 25.
67 See commentary to GP 25.
Under the Environmental Impact Assessment Act,61 Nigeria could embark
upon criminalising the activities of companies that do not follow the due
diligence mandates. Since it is expected that companies are subject to domestic
laws, it is expected that this direction will pave the way for the indirect
application of the human rights due diligence as contained in the GPs.
Thirdly, firms are expected to comply with all laws and respect
internationally recognised human rights within their spheres of operations.62
Thus corporations are to treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross
human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate.63
Even where the domestic laws of a state are inadequate to address the business
and human rights challenge, MNCs are enjoined to comply with all known
international human rights Principles. MNCs operate in highly challenging
contexts. This increases the risks of corporations being complicit in human
rights violations, particularly together with security forces funded by the state.
Thus, the importance of treating compliance with domestic and international
human rights laws, as a legal compliance cannot be far-fetched.
Interestingly, Nigeria has ratified the International Bill of Human Rights.64
Corporations, therefore, have no excuse to avoid compliance with domestic
and international human rights laws. Complying with these laws guarantees
their social licence to operate, even though they may have been legally
permitted to conduct business.
4.5 Pillar III: Access to Remedy
This Pillar emphasises states’ duty to protect against business-related human
rights abuse by ensuring through “judicial, administrative, legislative or other
appropriate means”65 those affected by such abuse are granted access to effective
remedy.66 This duty and responsibility falls entirely on the state. There are
two main remedies envisaged by this Principle: procedural and substantive.67
The substantive mechanism takes the form of apology, restitution,
rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and punitive
2016 THE FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE UN GPs IN NIGERIA 151
68 See commentary to GP 25.
69 See Surya Deva, Multinationals, Human Rights and International Law: Time to
Move beyond the ‘State-Centric’ Conception? in Jernej Letnar Èerniè and Tara
Van Ho (eds), Direct Human Rights Obligations of Corporations (The Hague: Wolf
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71 Article 8(2) of the South African Constitution, 1996 provides that a Bill of
Rights binds a natural or juristic person… Article 20(1) of the Kenyan
Constitution, 2010, provides that: The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds
all state organs and all persons. Article 260 defines person to include a company,
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sanctions.68 The procedural approach could be a little bit herculean.
Considering the level of corruption that has pervaded the Nigerian space,
bureaucratic procedural formalities, burden of proof, legal fees, legal
representations, corrupt judiciary and other extenuating factors, access to
effective remedies through the Nigerian courts could be insurmountable. Thus,
states must ensure that an independent and transparent judiciary is in place
to ensure implementation of the GPs.
Duty connotes legal obligations that transform into rights for the recipient.
Responsibility however denotes a moral act on the part of the corporations.
Civil societies and critics of the GPs oppose voluntary implementation of the
GPs.69 They claim that MNCs choose to respect the laws that suit them, especially
if those laws will be financially burdensome to them.70 While the concerns of
the civil societies are important, it is important to stress that corporations
owe a duty (and not responsibility) to obey domestic laws of their host states.
Unfortunately, Nigeria does not have a robust regulatory apparatus that
guarantees corporate human rights compliance. The next section discusses
various approaches through which Nigeria can resolve this dilemma.
6.6 Regulatory Measures for Implementing the GPs
6.6.1  The Nigerian Constitution
The Nigerian Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights as contained in
other Constitutions in Africa.71 The socio-economic rights, which are
guarantees for indirect implementation of the GPs, are contained in Chapter
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72 Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policies. The
justiceability of this section has been a subject of debate for decades. The section
contains economic, social and cultural rights, such as the rights to environment
and health.
73 See section 299 of the Companies and Allied Mattes Act, 1990. (“CAMA”).
74 Part X of CAMA.
75 section 279 of CAMA.
76 ibid.
II of the Constitution.72 Apart from chapter II, the Constitution makes no
reference to business and human rights. It is suggested, therefore, that Nigeria’s
Constitution should guarantee the International Bill of Rights. This Bill of
Rights will apply to all persons, corporations inclusive. After all, it is
unthinkable that MNCs will violate the Constitution of their host states.
6.6.2   The Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 (CAMA)
CAMA is the only legal document that regulates corporations in Nigeria.
Unfortunately, there is no human rights provision in the 696 sections of the
Act. Section 299 provides that: “…where an irregularity has been committed
in the course of a company’s affairs … only the company can sue to remedy
that wrong and only the company can ratify the irregular conduct.”73 Though
the company’s affairs is subject to different levels of interpretation, it seems
from the provisions that where the company engages in violation of human
rights, it is only the company that can sue to penalise itself. This is an impossible
task. Furthermore, this provision is contained in the part that deals with the
protection of minority against illegal and oppressive conduct,74 it is difficult
to imagine how a company can be progressive in ensuring compliance with
the GPs if it would be the violator and the prosecutor at the same time.
Indeed, this section envisages shareholders. This also leads to the failure of
CAMA to cater for other stakeholders in the company. To this end, the CAMA
should be amended and expanded to accommodate the interests of other
stakeholders, such as local communities, for companies in the extractive
resource industry.
The CAMA provides that Directors should have duty of care towards their
shareholders.75 It also states that Directors shall act in utmost good faith
towards the company.76 This implies that the Board of Directors of a company
should take rational decisions that will not violate the human rights of the
local communities where extractive resource projects are to be located.
Directors should consider human rights responsibilities as one of the best
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interests of the company. A good example is South Africa company law. Section
7(a) of the Companies Act of South Africa, 2008, provides that one of the
purposes of the Companies Act is to promote compliance with the Bill of
Rights as provided for in the Constitution.77 Section 15(1) further provides
that the Memorandum of Incorporation must be consistent with the Companies
Act.78 By natural implication, all incorporation documents of a company
must commit to human rights standards. To further ensure transparency and
accountability, South Africa’s Institute of Directors (IoDSA) produced the Kings
Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa.79 The Report requires
companies to issue periodic documents on their social responsibility projects.80
Since the CAMA was enacted in Nigeria 26 years ago, it has not undergone
any serious amendment procedure. MNCs are consistently becoming monstrous
and states in weak zones are becoming weaker as against the MNCs by the
day. Nigeria must take the front seat in addressing the business and human
rights debate in Africa. It must amend the CAMA to ensure that at the point of
incorporation, all extractive resource companies commit to the GPs. The GPs
must be printed and given to all companies as part of the incorporation
documents.81
Thankfully, it seems the judiciary is leaning towards corporate liability
for human rights violations. In West v. Jack & Ors,82 the Supreme Court held
that it does not matter where the infringement or contravention or threat of
contravention is coming from: “no person or body or persons, natural or
legal, or institution is exempted from the above provision.”83 Thus, all natural
and artificial persons are subject to human rights provisions under applicable
laws. Furthermore, Nigeria is a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination,84 any attempt to subject human beings to torture,
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and inhuman and degrading treatment is a violation of that person’s right to
dignity, which the Constitution and Convention prohibits. In Peterside v. IMB,85
the court rejected the argument that corporations cannot be prosecuted for
human rights violations. To this end, it is suggested that chapters II and IV of
the Constitution has “both vertical and horizontal application,”86 hence those
provisions bind the state, individuals and corporations.
6.7 Right to Property
One of the inalienable rights of every individual is the right to own immoveable
property in any place where such individual is legally allowed to reside.87
Extractive resource projects have the potential of depriving individuals from
this right. Where such projects resort to displacement, no form of compensation
is given to the indigenous people. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights recognises the right of individuals to the exclusive possession
and use of property.88 Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights provides that the right to property shall be guaranteed.89
Granted that the right to own land is subject to the states capacity to use
that land in the interest of the public, the exercise of this discretion must be
for the benefit of the indigenous peoples and not the MNCs whose main objective
is maximising profit. Sometimes, these lands are taken for political expediency
without any form of compensation. To remove indigenes from their ancestral
land is despicable, forceful eviction without any form of compensation is
morally appalling and ethically shameful. Besides, no form of compensation
is taken for wrongful displacement from land without recourse to public
interest.90 If members of the community had been part of the contractual
relationship between MNCs and government, land taken in the interest of the
public would have followed due legal process and would have genuinely
been in the interest of the public. In SERAC v. Nigeria,91 the Court held that
the forceful acquisition of the land belonging to the Ogoni people of Nigeria
without compensation was in violation of article 14 of the African Charter on
85 (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 377.
86 ICT Access to Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations – Federal
Republic of Nigeria (2012) 5.
87 Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
88 General Assembly Resolution 217 A, 10 December 1948.
89 Adopted 27 June, 1981.
90 Section 28 of the Land Use Act, 1978.
91 (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). Communication 155/96.
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Human and Peoples Rights.92
The extent of the protection of this right in Nigeria is doubtful. Most
extractive resource projects are in the interest of the public, employment is
generated, community is more developed, and the States get economic
incentives to provide basic amenities. On the other hand, the government
does not provide for a participatory framework for local community to be
consulted or participate in decisions about projects that will result in land
grabbing or removal from their ancestral lands. In implementing the GPs,
government must include guarantees that project sites and lands have not
been indiscriminately acquired, and where procedurally acquired, adequate
compensation has been paid to those whose lands have been affected. This
policy would prompt states to take the human rights agenda seriously. To
achieve this, certain mechanisms must be put in place. Government must
clarify the exact duties of MNCs under the Nigerian Constitution and corporate
laws. This will help determine the liability of MNCs under the laws earlier
analysed.
4.  AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF
RESOURCE WEALTH
There is no justification for Nigeria to lower its human rights standards so
that these MNCs can continue to operate in their countries. Short-term gains
are illusory and they undermine longer-term recovery.93 The long and
uncontrolled governance gaps embolden the MNCs to operate without sanctions
or caution.
Extractive resource wealth in Nigeria has led to unstable growth,
macroeconomic instability;94 high rates of unemployment, poverty and
inequality;95 environmental degradation; resource-related conflicts96 and
entrenched corruption.97 The so-called resource curse premise captures these
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ill effects of resource-dependence in Nigeria.98 In contrast, developed countries
have demonstrated the capacity to implement and enforce their laws and
policies and engage local communities in the extraction of natural resources
located in those countries. The issue of environmental pollution, ethnic
conflicts and guerrilla warfare in extractive resource rich zones are issues of
monumental and humanitarian tragedy.
The GPs state that the primary duty to protect human rights fall on the
state. Observably, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) presents a
particularly interesting case. DRC is a resource-rich country. However, it has
been engulfed in wars and ethnic conflicts making it difficult to reap the
benefits of those resources. Armed groups control the resources, commercial
activities are unimpeded and minerals are exported from the country. Therefore,
if states are solely charged with human rights obligations, how will the state
of DRC effectively protect the activities that go on in the areas controlled by
armed groups? There are lots of problems in weak governance zones. Bad
actors are in control. States and MNCs (particularly those operating in weak
zones) have a duty to ensure that human rights principles are upheld.
The GPs create a responsibility, which introduces a nouvelle outlook on
how businesses should think about human rights. The problem with these
rules is not that they are inadequate. It is a problem of enforcement. The
enforcement regime is either lacking or non-existent. Apart from strengthening
local institutions charged with domestic implementation and enforcement of
these laws, control measures should be emphasised if an MNC goes to these
weak zones. The mere fact that host countries do not enforce their laws
should not be an avenue to aid and abet corrupt governments, thereby avoiding
human rights enforcements. If these were aggressively enforced against the
MNCs, the notorious Ogoni and Marikana disasters would not have occurred.
In effect, therefore, if Nigerian government is violating the rights of indigenous
peoples of the Niger Delta, MNCs should not be complicit. This complicity
rule should also extend to third parties directly responsible to the MNCs. This
would erode the application of separate legal personality principle usually
used by the MNCs to avoid liability.
98 The resource curse refers to a situation where resource-dependent countries
grow slowly, lack economic diversification, suffer from environmental degrada-
tion, experience corruption, undergo violent conflict, and local communities,
mainly indigenous peoples and women, do not fully participate in decision-
making.
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5.  CONCLUSION
This article has considered the implementation of the GPs in Nigeria. It has
also argued for the strengthening of Nigeria’s domestic laws, especially the
Constitution, corporate law and the right to property under the Act, and the
Constitution to ensure effective implementation of the GPs. No doubt,
implementing the GPs will involve an investigation into corporate abuse,
monitoring of corporate conduct and reporting on human rights due diligence.
Certainly, these are developments MNCs would resist. Reporting on and
monitoring the activities of MNCs is key to implementing the GPs. There
must be a tremendous improvement in firms’ compliance with human rights
standards. This could be achieved through periodic report on the activities of
the firm and the creation of a monitoring agency truly devoted to monitoring
firms’ compliance with human rights standards. Until Nigeria de-emphasises
financial incentive as the goal of political governance, turning resource wealth
into improved standard of living for the people will only be a mirage. Most
sub-Saharan African countries encountered two major challenges which have
impacted growth trajectory. First, the timing to bring extractive industries to
fruition coincided with the countries’ just attained independence or a transition
phase, significantly putting the governments to a test.99 Instead of development,
the newfound wealth soon turned the fragile democracies into autocratic
governments. Second, the financial burden occasioned by the huge investment
on oil and gas projects deprived the fragile democracies the much-needed
financial reprieve to embark on the project.100
The Nigerian Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights for all
its citizens, including corporations. Corporations can sue to enforce their
fundamental human rights to own property or freedom of expression. It is,
therefore, unconscionable for corporations to enjoy these rights but fail to
bear responsibilities to respect the rights of others under the same Constitution.
The starting point is for the company law to impose human rights obligations
on MNCs and local companies operating in the extractive resource industry
in Nigeria.
99 Gavin Hilson, “Corporate Social Responsibility in the extractive industry:
Experiences from developing countries” (2012) 37 Resource Policy 132.
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